Orientalist Views of Democracy and Tunisian Youth’s Post-2011 Revolution Frustrations

In December 2010, a 26-year-old Tunisian man, Mohamed Bouazizi, set himself on fire, demanding employability and better socio-economic conditions for living. By that, Bouazizi sparked off the Arab Uprisings, triggering protests in Tunisia with his death in January 2011. The protests spread to other countries of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), resulting in revolutions, overthrown governments, long-term destructive wars, or almost failed states in different countries of the region.

In January 2011, the government of Tunisia was overthrown, and the presidency of Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, who was in power for 24 years, ended. Amidst this, Tunisia emerged as the so-called “success story” of the Arab Uprisings (Gabsi, 2019).

Tunisia’s young generation is considered a core actor in the revolution. The economic, social, and political issues related to young people, such as high unemployment rates or political disengagement, causing youth exclusion from society, were believed to be the primary source of the grievances of the young generation. Yet, over a decade later, many of their grievances remain unresolved.

The revolutionary aspirations of Tunisia’s youth were not solely homegrown. Influenced by the global discourse of democracy and development, many young people equated success with achieving a Western-style democracy characterized by free elections, individual rights, and accountable governance. These ideals reflect Edward Said’s concept of Orientalism, where Western narratives frame the East as an exotic and unchangeable entity that is backward, underdeveloped, uncivilized, autocratic, violent, and most importantly, in need of Western governing models.

For Tunisia’s youth, these expectations translated into an almost magical belief that the revolution would solve the country’s deep-seated issues simply by toppling Ben Ali’s regime (Cole, 2014). This idealized vision was rooted in a broader narrative that measures progress with Western benchmarks, particularly European social democracies. However, the realities of post-revolution Tunisia have been starkly different, which led to the youth’s political frustrations.

Youth unemployment remains a critical challenge, with educated young people bearing the brunt. Bouazizi himself was a university graduate, reduced to selling vegetables to make ends meet. Post-revolution governments have struggled to address these issues, hampered by domestic political instability, regional conflicts, and global economic pressures (Schaefer, 2018). Frequent changes in leadership disrupted the implementation of long-term policies, further increasing the economic challenges.

Political disengagement compounds the problem. Many young people feel excluded from decision-making processes, fostering apathy and mistrust toward political institutions. For some, the revolution has become a “stolen” opportunity, leaving them disillusioned and seeking stability elsewhere, often through migration (Dihstelhoff, 2018).

Edward Said’s theory of Orientalism offers a lens to understand both external and internal narratives around Tunisia’s revolution. The Arab Uprisings of 2011 got a number of Orientalist descriptions, including even Orientalist names, i.e., “Arab Spring” or “Arab Awakening”, underestimating the large-scale processes happening in the region throughout history and describing the 2011 events as exceptional and new to the Arab world. One of the causes of these views is the old Western perception of “liberal democracy” and “democratization”. The dominant discourse that emerged at the end of the 20th century among Western analysts stated that there is no better alternative system than the Western liberal democracy, suggesting that the West should start spreading the ideas of true democracy to “Others” (Sadowski, 1993, p.14). In the framework of these perceptions, the United States, for example, even started “democracy promoting” campaigns and projects for the MENA region that included trainings for the Arab youth.

These narratives did not only shape external perceptions but also influenced the revolutionary youth. Many internalized the belief that a Western-style democracy was the ultimate goal and measure of success. When this vision failed to materialize in the face of structural and political challenges, frustration and disillusionment grew.

References

Cole J., (2014) The New Arabs: How the Millennials are changing the Middle East (New York: Simon & Schuster).

Dihstelhoff, J. (2018). Coping with Frustration A Self-Assessment of Tunisian Youth FES MENA Youth Study: Country Analysis Tunisia. [online] Available at: https://library.fes.de/pdf-files/iez/14407.pdf [Accessed 02 May 2023].

Gabsi Z., ‘Tunisia’s youth: awakened identity and challenges post-Arab Spring,’ British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 46 (2019): p.68–87, doi:10.1080/13530194.2017.1371000;

Sadowski, Y. (1993). The New Orientalism and the Democracy Debate. Middle East Report, (183), p.14-21+40. doi:https://doi.org/10.2307/3012572.

Seidman, S., (2013). Contested knowledge. Chichester.: John Wiley & Sons.

Schaefer I. (2018), Political Revolt and Youth Unemployment in Tunisia Exploring the Education-Employment Mismatch, Berlin, Germany, Palgrave Macmillan.